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OSBORN

Y.

OSBORN.I aL

L. A. 22540.
Supreme Court of California.
In Bank.
March 1, 19'"'04.

Rehearing Denied ·March 25, 1954.

Suit to quiet title. The Superior Court,
,Los Angeles 'County, Ben V. -Curler, J"
.entered' judgment from which the plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Traynor, J.,
held that where -compromise settlement of
dispute between father and son as to title
to certain property provided for holding of
title by father until his death, and vesting
in son upon father's demise, and father was
required to deliver deed of such tenor to
escrow holder, father received, his consideration for the deed when the compromise
settlement was executed, and there were no
·-conditions precedent to vesting of legal title
in remainder 'in son, but such ,title passed,
if there was' a valid delivery, at t'ime of deposit of deed, even -though deed was to be
retained by holder until father's death.
Judgmen,t reyersed.
Carter, J., dissented in part and Schauer, J., dissented.
Prior·opinion, 256 P.2d 653.
t.

Deeds.~132,

141

The deposit of a deed granting an estate in fee simple, with instructions that it
be transmitted to the grantee -upon the
death of the grantor, conveys a remainder
interest 'in fee simple with a life estate- reserved in' the grantor, if the grantor intended the deposit to be irrevocable.
2. Escrows

Cal

333.

Cite as 267 P.2d 333

~12

Where grant'or, as party to binding
contract for sale of realty with reservation
of life estate, deposits the deed in escrow,
the legal title passes to the grantee at the
time of his completion of the conditions
precedent, if any, regardless of whether
'the escrow holder gives grantee physical
·position of the deed, since grantor's delivery in escrow is absolute and cannot
thereafter be disaffirmed.

certain property provided for holding of
title by father until his death, and vesting.
in son upon father's demise, and father was
'l'equired to deliver deed of such tenor to
escrow holder, father received his consid~
eration for the deed when the compromise
settlement was executed, and there were no

conditions precedent to vesting of legal title
in remainder in son, but such title passed,
if there was a valicl delivery, at time of
deposit of deed, even though deed was to
be retained by holder until father's death.
4. Oeeds ~56(2), 200
Evidence ~230(2, 3)

The question of whether a deed was delivered is one of intent, and resort may be
had 'to the acts and declarations of the'
grantor, both before and after his transmisw
sion of the deed to the grantee or a third·
party, for purpose of determining such intent.
5. Deeds ¢::;;::>66

Where grantor's only instructions with'
respect to delivery of a deed are' in' writing, the effect of the transaction depends;
upon the true construction of the writing,
and it is a pure question bf law whether
there was an absolute delivery of the de~d.
6. Deeds ¢::;;::>61
Ag~eement between rather '<l:nd son in!
settlement of dispute as to title to 'certain'
property, which required father to deposit'
in escrow a deed granting, remafnder in-··
terest in fee simple to son, and reserving,
life estate in father, and which expressly'
instructed escrow holders to resist any at-,
tempt by either father or son to obtairi,pbs-:
session of deed prior to demise of father,:
followed by a delivery of d.(;ed, ip. ac.. ,
cordance therewith, resulted in, an absolute.!
delivery, notwithsta~ding reservation .in
father of right to revoke deed in event son
harmed him or refused to carry oilt terms'
of the agreement, since right to revoke
merely limited the future interest created
to a vested remainder subject to being
divested uIJon happening of a condition
subsequent.

~t3
7. Appeal and Error ~878(1)
Where compromise settlement or disThe failure to ~ake an appeal demon-.
,pute between father and son as to title to strates only satisfacti9n wi!~_ the judg~ent

3. Escrows

334<

Cal.

as it is,' and not as
reversal.
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it 'is changed by a partial

8. Appeal and Error <lP878(1), 1172(1)

that upon execution of:the' within Stipulation that Thomas D.Osborn will execute
either by deed contract or declaration of
trust sufficient documents, convey~ces or
declarations so that the property known as
Lot 97, Casa Verduga Villa Tract, etc., will
be retained in the name of Thomas D. Osborn, during his lifetime and that the same
should vest in his son 11erinoeth R. Osborn
at the time of the demise of the said Thomas D. Osborn." After the execution of the
stipulation, the probate court distributed Lot
97 to Thomas.

Where both that part of judgment refusing to quiet title in plaintiff and that
portion refusing to quiet title in plaintiff's
stepmother, who ·purchased at execution
sale, involved question of whether plaintiff
had acquired a rema'jnder interest under
deed deposited in escrow by his fathe'r pursuant to agreement settling dispute as to
ownership of certain property, Supreme
Court had jurisdiction to review the entire
On July 7, 1939, pursuant to the stipJudgment, even though the execution purchaser did not appeal, and it would reverse ulation, Thomas and Merinoeth executed a
the entire judgment upon determination trust agreement, and Thomas executed a
that trial court erred in determining that deed "in accordance with the terms and conditions of that certain trust agreement of
no remainder interest passed.
July 7th, 1939, * * * and * * •
Guerin & Guerin and John
Angeles, for appellant.

J.

subject to all conditions, exceptions and
as in said trust agreement
reservations
Guerin, Los

Louis Warren, Los Angeles, for respondents.
TRAYNOR, Justice.
PIa:intiff Merinoeth Osborn appeals from
an adverse judgment on his complaint- to
quiet title to certain real property in Los
Angeles County, known as Lot 97 of the
Casa Verduga Villa Tract. Defendant
Louise Osborn, - plaintiff's stepmother, answered and cross-complained to have title
to Lot 97 quieted in her. Judgment W~LS
entered for plaintiff on the cross-complaint,
and defendant Louise Osborn has not appealed therefrom. The other defendants
named' in the complaint disclaim any interest in the property.
Lot 97 was originally acquired by Merinoeth's mother Chloie Osborn, in 1922.
Chloie died intestate leaving her husband,
Thomas D. Osborn, and their son, Merinoeth, surviving. On June 27, 1939, during
the administration of ChIoie's estate, Merinoeth and Thomas executed a "Stipulation",
subsequently approved by the court, to resolve their conflicting claims to ChIoie's estate. The material part of this stipulation
follows: . "It is further' stipulated and
agreed by and between the parties hereto

provided." (Italics added.) The deed
granted Lot 97 to Merinoeth subject to a
life estate in Thomas. The trust agreement
provided that the deed to Lot 97 "shall be
turned over and delivered to the Trustees
to hold and keep possession of said (ie'ed,
not to record the same during the lifetime
of" Thomas. The trustees were instructed
to "turn over and deliver" the deed to Meri~
noeth on the death of Thomas. It was recited in the trust agreement that Thomas
reserved a life estate in the property, and
that he also reserved "the right to revoke
the deed in the event [Merinoeth] wilfully
harms [Thomas], and [Merinoeth] reserves
the right to cancel this agreement if [Thomas] wilfully harms" him. (Italics added.)
Other material parts of the trust agreement
are: "The parties hereto further agree that

in the event any attempt is 1nade by either
party hereto to break the terms of the within trust agreement, or to force the trustees
to surrender the within described deed prior
to the demise of [Thomas] by court action,.
or other proceedings, then, in that event,
the party attempting to break the tenns of
the within trust agreement, shall pay in addition to expenses and court costs, a reasonab~e attorney's fee to the said trustees.
The parties hereto- further authoro:ze and

instruct the trustees herein mentioned It)
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defend any attempts made by either parties
hereto to break the terms of the within trust
agreement, or to force the trustees to surrender the within described deed. * * *
The wilfull failure or refusal on the party
[sic] of either party hereto to carry out the
terms and conditions of the within trust
agreement, or the wilfull refusal or failure
of either party to comply with the obligations herein provided, on his part to be
performed, shall permit either party to rescind this agreement and shall. confer upon
the grantor the right to cancel the within
mentioned deed and this agreement by a
declaration duly executed and recorded with
the formality of a deed and a thirty day
written notice thereof served on the grantee, or his attorney." (Italics added.) The
deed was deposited with defendants Franklin and Warner, who were named as trustees in the trust agreement.
Merinoeth had become indebted to Warner for legal services in the probate of
Chloie's estate and the preparation of the
trust agreement. In 1941, Warner resigned
as trustee and assigned his claim against
Merinoeth to his secretary, Champion, who
recovered judgment thereon. Execution
was levied on Merinoeth's interest in Lot
97, and the property was sold in 1942 to
Champion for $336.37. Thereafter, at the
request of Thomas, Champion transferred
the certificate of sale to Louise Osborn for
$415. Although Louise contends that Merinoeth had notice of these proceedings, he
made no appearance and disclaims any
knowledge of them.
In anticipation of a sale of Merinoeth's
interest in Lot 97 to Thomas, an agreement
purporting to cancel the trust agreement
was executed on January 14, 1946 and then
cancelled in March 1946. Thomas died intestate on December 31, 1946, leaving his
second wife, Louise, and Merinoeth surviving. Merinoeth's subsequent demand upon the trustees for the deed executed by
Thomas was refused.
In refusing to quiet title in either Mer-inoeth or Louise, the trial court concluded
that Merinoeth had not acquired any interest in Lot 97 under the deed executed by

OaL
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Thomas and deposited with Warner and
Franklin. Since Merinoeth had acquired
no interest, the court concluded that Louise
acquired none by reason of the execution
sale.
Plaintiff's basic contention on this appeal is bhat the trial court erred in holding
that he acquired no interest in Lot 97 under
the deed executed by Thomas and deposited
with Warner and Franklin to be transmitted to him on the death of Thomas. Plaintiff contends that the deposit with Warner
and Franklin constituted a valid delivery
immediately vesting in him- a remainder
interest in the property. The first issue to
be resolved, therefore, is the validity and
effect of the deed executed by Thomas.
[1,2] It has long been established in
this state that the deposit of a deed granting an estate in fee simple, with instructions that it be transmitted to the grantee
upon the death of the grantor, conveys a
remainder interest in fee simple with a life
estate reserved in the grantor, if uhe grantor intended the deposit to be irrevocable.
Bury v. Young, 98 Cal. 446, 451-452, 33 P.
338; Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 206-208,
162 P. 639, L.R.A.1917C, 961; Wilkerson v.
Seib, 20 Cal.2d 556, 560, 127 P.2d 904. The
result is the same as if the grantor delivered to the grantee a deed reserving a .life
estate and granting a remainder in fee.
The same result is also ac.complished by the
deposit of a deed in escrow pursuant to a
binding contract of sale of a remainder and
the grantee's performance of the conditions
of the escrow. At the time of the execution of uhe contract of sale, the grantee acquires an equitable title to the estate :being
sold.; the :grantor retains the legal title as
security for the purchase price. The legal
title passes to the grantee at the time of
his completion of the conditions precedent,
whether or not the escrow holder gives him
physical possession of the deed; the grantor's delivery to the escrow holder is absolute and cannot thereafter be disaffirmed.
Cannon v. Handley, 72 Cal. 133, 140, 13 P.
315; McDonald v. Huff, 77 Cal. 279, 282,
19 P. 499; Bradbury v. Davenport, 120
Cal. 152, 154, 52 P. 301; see, also, Hagge
v. Drew, 27 Cal.2d 368, 375, 165 P.2d 461.
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: [3l" In the present case, 'the deed from
Thomas'to Merinoeth was' executed :pursu-"
ant' to "a binding contract supported by ade~
quate' ,consideration. On .the fa'ce of the
deed, Thomas reserved a life estate and
granted" a ·remainder to Merirtoeth. :When
Thomas delivered the deed to the trustees,
there were ·no conditions precedent for
Metinoeth; to. 'perform. Thomas had re':'
ceived the ,·conside:ration ·for the grant,
when the' compromise' settlement of Chloie's'
estate was executed. The provision that
the .. trustees ,should hold the deed until:
Thomas' death was, liot a: condition prece~
dent to' the ,passage. of legal tit1e,. for: even'
fn cases 6f gift,-e. g.,. Bury v. Yotmg, supra,
an instruction that the depositary is t.o ·retra,in; possession 9f the de~d until, the"death
of. the gra:t~.t?r: do~s not prevent the'deed.
fro~ being ~perative as a present corivey:".
anee. In this cas.e, M.erinoeth was.·,not '<1..
donee; he 'was a purchaser: fo~ value, ~l
r~~dy' 'ves'ted with an equitable title to 'the
i'erriainder•... The ~ituation is thus ~nalogous
to:. that of a t'rue escrow after thd purchas':
has perf~rmed all O,f the condidori~ 'pr~G:"
edent'.. " Performance' Qf those coriditio"ns
aut6matkally ves'ts ."'the legal "titl~ in, hin{
e~e'n thb·ugh \4eescrow holder reiains pos-

er

~essiori,

of ill;; .d.~~d.' .., ... . .

.,

.' [4-6] ·Defe·rtdanf contends, .however,
that Thomas did not:make a legal delivery
of -the: deed. Delivery is question of intent: . In some caseS to as'certain 'the' 'grantor's intent it is'.necessarY to have' recours'e
to his acts and dec:Iarations both before and
after his··transmission· cit" the deed to the
grantee or a third party. Williams v. Kidd,
170 Cal. 631, 649-652, 151 P. 1; Rice v.
Carey, 170 Cal. 748; 75:J.c754, ·151 p, 135;
Donahue v, Sweeney, 171 Cal. 388,: 391-392,
153 P. 708; Northern Cal. Conference
Ass'n, etc., v. Smith, 209 Cal. 26, 33, 285P,
314. When,: as here, however, the' grantor's Hanly :instructions are in writing~ the'
effect of the"transaction depends upon' the
true' construction of the' writing. . It is, in
other words~ a: pure questioh of law whether there ·was an .absolute delivery· or not.".
Moore V,. Trott, 156 CaL 353, 357, 104 P.
578, 580. Thomas executed the deed and
delivered. it .-to ,the trustees 'pursuant to the'

a

provisipns o·f. the ·frust ·agreement. ' It was,
a completed ad. and nothing. r>emaine"d\ to· be
done to vest the legal title to the remainder
in Merinoeth. Thomas' was bound by the.
terms orthe trust agreement,: executed con . .
temporaneously with the deed, 'riot" to at.:.·
tempt to r'ecall the deed· from' the posses~
sion' of the trustees.- The trustees, were spe
cifically instructed to resist any attempt by
either Thomas or Me'riri.6eth to . obtain pos-.
session of the deed prior' to the demise of
Thomas, and' were futther il)str.ucted to
hold the deed for the benefit of Merinoeth.
Even if it had been contended that Merinoeth had harmed Thomas o~ failed to car-,
ry'but the tenus pfthe trust agreement and
Thomas had wished to assert his right -to
revoke, he 'could 'not redill the deed;· 'he had
to exe'cute arid ,record a' declaration 'of revo·;'"
cation with. the formality of a deed, after
giving thirty d~ys' notice thereof :to.. Mer,
inoeth,yllO might then defeat the proposed
revocation hy showing that ther'e was no
,;,iolation of the ti-'ust agreement. .
.
4

It is c1ear,therefore, that Thomas did not
retain control ove.r the deed after he d~liv~
ered it to the trustees. There is nothing in
the trust. agreement, or external: to. it, .to
indicate, that' Thom~s did not intend the
trans~is'sjon' of the deed to the. trustees t~
be a valid legal delivery, Indeed, the whole
tenor 'of the stipulation and the trust agreement ..is that Thomas 'intended to grant
Merinoeth a pre~ently vested remainder intere$t. In the stipulation· of June 27th,
Thomas promised .that 'Iupon execution of
the within Stipulation" he would execute
the documents necessary to transfer a remainder interest to Merinoeth. The trustagreement, contained a number of restrictjons .on Thom~s' right to use the prope:~ty
during his lifetime. If Merinoeth 'was not
to have' a 'presently .vested remainder interest, these provisions were superfluous.·
Fur~hermore, Thomas' conduct aftd' the
execution and delivery. of the deed, 'in re':'
questing Champion to' sell the certificate
frorri the" execiltion sale and, in negotiating
with Merinoeth in 1946 (after the exeeu-·
tion sale)' for. the 'purchase 'of his interest in
t\le ·pr.operty .for $3,500, 'is corroborative of
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I: TJiomas' 'intent as ~evealed in the docu·ments.

Defendant contends, however, that
:Thomas' reservation of the right to revoke the deed, in the ·event that Merinoeth
harmed him or refused to' carry out the
terms of the trust agreement, made the
delivery to the trustees conditional' so that"
no estate vested in Merinoeth by virtue of
the deposit of the deed with the trustees.
This contention cannot be sustained. Thomas' right t9 revoke did, not· affect the delivery to the trustees, but'merely limited the
future interest created to a vested remainder subject to being, divested upon the
happening of a condition subsequent. The
situation is similar to that in Tennant v.
John Tennant Memorial Home, 167 Cal.
570, 140 P. 242, where the grantor reserved an unqualified right to revoke on the
face 'of the deed, which" granted a remainder in fee to vest in possession at the termination of the "grantor's life estate. It"
there held that the grantee acquired a
remain"der subject to a condition subsequent,' and that "the power to revoke did
not operate to destroy, or in anywise re-,
strict the effect of the· deed as a present
cOJ,lvey'ance of a future vested interest."

was

167 Cal. 570, 578, 140 P. 242, 246; see,
also, . Gray v. Union Trust

CO~,

171 Cal.

,637, 642-643, 154P. 306; Scott, The Law
. of Trusts, 1939, Vol. I, § 57.1. These cases
are distinguishable from those on which
; defendant relies to sustain her contention
, that the grantor's reservation' of a right to
I revoke renders the delivery conditional.

ISee Kenney v.

Parks, 125 Cal. 146, 15(}"

,lSI, 57 P. 772; M.oore v. Trott, 156 Cal.
353, 357, 104 P. 578; Long v. Ryan, 166
Cal. 442, 445, 137 P. 29. The latter

icases were cases of gift, and the court was
1

i concerned

with the problem of attempted
Itestamentary disposition without complianCe with the statute of wills. In those
cases, the grantors reserved the right to
recall their deeds from the depositary. It
,was found that the respective grantors did
Ino
t 'mtend any mterest
.
to pass to the grantees when the deeds were given to the depositary, but only intended an interest to
pass at the time of their death. The

i
I

I

a67 P,2d-22
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ri,ght to' reVOKe was, therefore, a right· to
recall the deed, and attached to the delivery and not to the interest granted.
In the present case, the deed was executed
and delivered to the trustees, not to accomplish any testamentary purpose, but to discharge Thomas' obligation's under the contract he entered into with Merinoeth to
cOI~promise their conflicting claims to
Chloic's estate. This contract vested Merinoeth with an equitable title to the remainder, since he had a specifically enforceable right to have Thomas convey
the legal title. The legal title was con- .
vcyed when the deed was delivered to the
trustees under a binding contract that made
the delivery irrevocable. Cannon v. Handley, supra; McDonald
Huff, supra;

v.

Pothast v. Kind, 218 Cal. 192, 195, 24 P.2d
771; see also, Brunoni v. Brunoni, 93 Cal.

App.2d 215, 219, 208 P.2d 1028. Although
Thomas could have accomplished the same
result by delivering a deed to Merinoeth
with the same reservations as those set
forth in the trust agreement, see Tennant
v. John Tennant Memorial Home, suprajust as in the cases like Bury v~ Young,
supra, the same result could be accomplished by delivery to the grantee of a deed'
granting a remainder interest-the effect
the transaction is the same:. Merinoeth acquired a vested remainder subject to divestment should he breach th\! terms of the
trust agreement.
The only question remaining is the order that should now be made by this Court~
Merinoeth contends that the part of the
judgment refusing to quiet title in him
should be reversed with directions to enter a judgment quieting his title to the
property and that the part of the judgment
refusing to quiet title in Louise should be
affirmed because she di'd not appeal. This
contention cannot be sustained.

of

[7] The trial court determined that
Merinoeth did not obtain an interest under
the deed and therefore refused to quiet
title either in him or in Louise. If Merinoeth did not acquire a remainder interest, Louise could acquire nothing by the
execution sale. Apparently in the belief
that as a result of the Judgment each party

33S'
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would get half the property as an heir of
Thomas, Louise did not appeal. Merinoeth
appealed, contending that he acquired a re~
mainder interest under the deed, that the
execution sale did not pass any interest to
Louise, and that he was therefore entitled
to the property. Had Louise appealed, her
position could only be that Merinoeth acquired a remainder interest and that the
execution sale was effective. That contention, however, would concede the first half
of Merinoeth's proof-that he acquired a
remainder interest-a concession fatal to
a claim that she was entitled to half the
property as an heir of Thomas. She was
apparently willing to let the judgment
stand and take half an interest as heir
rather than risk an adverse ruling with
respect to the execution sale, which would
leave her with nothing. "[T]he failure to
take an appeal demonstrates only satisfaction with the judgment as is, not as
changed by a partial revers'at. One may
elect to stand upon a judgment which, he
believes, although largely in his favor, does
not give him all of the bene'fits to which
he is entitled. To avoid the time and expense of further litigation, he may be
persuaded to permit the unfavorable portions to stand in reliance upon the benefits
received in the other parts." American
Enterprise, Inc. 'v. Van Winkle, 39 Cal.2d
210, 221, 246 P.2d 935, 940:

to Louise'and' unless the etltire juagment is
reversed she will be denied an opportunity
to establish her cl;:tim that the execution
sale was valid. A complete reversal is
therefore appropriate. Blache v. Blache,
supra; Rediker v. Rediker, 35 Cal.2d 796,
798, 221 P.2d 1, 20 A.L.R.2d 1152; Estate
of Murphey, 7 Ca1.2d 712, 717, 62 P.2d 374;
d. Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39 Ca1.2d 602, 609,
248 P.2d 910.
The judgment is reversed. The parties
are to bear their own costs on appeal.
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK, EDMONDS, and SPENCE, J]., concur.

CARTER, Justice (concurring and dissenting in part).
I concur in the reversal of that portion
of the judgment from which plaintiff appealed, which reads as follows: "That
plaintiff take nothing by reason of his
amended complaint herein and that defendant Louise L. Osborn have judgment
for costs of court expended in the sum
of $-'_ _," but I dissent from the holding of the majority that the judgment
against defendant· and cross-complainant
from which no appeal was taken must also
be reversed. That portion of the judgment reads as follows: "That crOss-com·
plainant take nothing' by reason of 'her
cross-complaint herein, and that cross-de-'
,[8] Both parts of the judgment turned fendant Merinoeth R. Oshorn have judgon the trial court's construction of the deed ment for costs of court expended in the
and agreement. It refused to quiet title, in sum of $--."
Merinoeth on the ground that he' did not . It is obvious from a reading of the maacquire an interest by the deed and agree- jority opinion that the two. portions of the
ment; it refused to quiet title in Louise judgment abo'\\e quoted are separate and
for the same reason. Since both parts of distinct and that they are in no wise interthe judgment embrace the identical issue- dependent, or that the portion from which
did Merinoeth acquire a' remaindkr inter- plaintiff and cross-defendant has appealed
est under the deed-we have jurisdiction is so connected with the remainder, froni'
to review the entire judgment. American which no appeal was taken, that the apEnterprise, Inc. v. Van Winkle, supra, 39 peal .from the first part affects the second
Ca1.2d 210, 217, 246 P,2d 935; B1ache v. part and involves a consideration of the
B1ache, 37 Ca1.2d 531, 538, 233 P.2d 547; whole judgment. This conclusion is maniMilo v. Prior, 210 Cal. 569, 571, 292 P. fest from the face of the majority opinion
647; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 362, itself where it discusses in detail both the
125 P. 904. Our decision that a remainder facts and the law relating to plaintiff's
interest passed under the deed removes the side of the case but only gives a' passing
basis of the trial court's decision adverse reference to the basis upon which defend-
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ant and cross-complainant. claims title to
the property. The' majority opinion -does
not purport to hold that there would have
been merit in an appeal prosecuted by defendant and cross-complainant if such an
appeal had been taken. Notwithstanding
this situation, the majority directs the reversal of the entire judgment so that the
claims of the defendant and cross-complainant set up in her cross-complaint may
again be litigated in the trial court.
In so holding the majority goes outside
of the record in suggesting possible reasons why defendant and cross-complainant
did not appeal, as if her reasons for not
appealing had any bearing whatever 'upon
the scope of review of this court on an
appeal by plaintiff from the portion of the
judgment against him. Until the decision
of this court in Hamasaki v. Flotho, 39
Cal.2d 602, 248 P.2d 910, it was the settled
rule that "when an appeal is taken from
a part of a judgment or order not so intimately connected with the remainder
that a reversal of the part appealed from
would require a reconsideration of the
whole case in the court below, an appellate court can review only the portion appealed from. The unaffected parts must
be deemed final, and can be enforced pending the appeaL" See 4 Cal.Jur.2d, § 535,
p. 389. This rule has been followed in
every case deCided by this court prior to
the Hamasaki case, supra, and it has never
been departed from except in the Hamasa·
ki case. In Glassco v. Et Sereno Country
Club, Inc., 217 Cal. 90, at page 91, 17 P.2d
703, the late Chief Justice Waste, speaking for a unanimous court, said: II Preliminarily, it might be said that that portion of the judgment denying the appellants a lien, and which is attacked by the
plaintiffs in their brief herein, is not properly a subject of review upon this appeal
because of the insufficiency of the notice
of appeal. The notice states that the appeal is 'from so much of the judgment herein as denies relief to the plaintiffs against
the said defendant, Ootilde G. Castruccio
* * *.' The notice of appeal makes no
mention of that separate and distinct portion of. the judgment denying plaintiffs a
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lien. .It is elementary that an appeal from
a po-rtioh, of a judgment brings, up for re~
view only that portion designated in the
notice of appeal. 2 Cal.Jur. ISS, § 25.
While it is true that notices of appeal are
to be liberally construed with a view to
hearing cause's on their merits (Harrelson
v. Miller & Lux, [Inc.], 182 Cal. 408, 414,
188 P. 800), we are of the opinion that the
notice filed in the present case does not
present la mere misdescription' of the judgment, calling for the application of said
rule, but rather presents a situation some·
what analogous to that presented in Dimi·
ty v. Dixon, 74 Cal.App. 714, 718, 241 P.
905, viz. one where the. description of that
portion of the judgment appealed from is
so clear and unmistakable as' to preclude a
description of that portion of the judgment
denying appellants a lien." The following
cases fully support the rule that an appellate Court has jurisdiction to review the
portion of the judgment appealed from
only unless the part appealed from is so
interwoven and connected with the remainder, or so dependent thereon, that the ap·
peal from a part affects the other parts
or involves a consideration of the' whole,
and is really an appeal from the whole
judgment: Lake v. Superior Court, 187
Cal. 116, 200 P. 1041; G. Ganahl Lumber
Co. v. Weinsveig, 168 Cal. 664, 143 P.
1025; Whalen v. Smith, 163 Cal. 360, 125
-P. 904; In re Burdick's Estate, 112 Cal.
387, 44 P. 734; Luck v. Luck, 83 Cal. 574,
23 P. 1035; Early v. Mannix, IS Cal. 149;
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Fisher, 106
Cal. 224, 39 P. 758.
It must be remembered that the judg#
ment denying plaintiff relief was based
upon his complaint and the evidence offered
by him in support of the allegations of the
complaint that he was the owner of the
property as a result of the deed executed
by his father and placed in escrow to be
delivered to plaintiff upon his father's
death. The judgment denying defendant
relief was based upon the allegations of
her cross-complaint that she was the owner
of the property as the result -of an execu~
tion sale under a judgment against plaintiff. It seems to me that if this court has
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the power to review the portion of. the
judgment against the defendant, it should
determine on this appeal the validity of
the execution sale and the conveyances
under which defendant claims and' then
reverse the entire judgment with directions to render judgment' either in favor
of plaintiff or defendant, thus bringing an
end
the litigation. However, the majority does not purport to do this but nevertheless . reverses the :judgment against
the defendant who did not appeal therefrom and makes no contention that the
judgment against her was erroneous.

to

. Section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: . '_'Any person aggrieve,d
'may appeal in the cases prescribed in, this
title. The party appealing is known a·s'the
appellant, and the adverse party as' .the
respondent." (Emphasis added.) It goes
without saying that pl;:tintiff could 'not have
appe'aled from the portion of the judgment against the defendant, since he was
not aggrieved thereby, and defendant could
not have appealed from the portion of .the
judgment against plaintiff for the same
reason. The~eforeJ plail1tiff appealed from
the only portion of the judgment from
which he could lawfully appeal.
Section 956 of the Code of Civil Procedure which covers the matters which may
be reviewed on appeal from a judgment
concludes with the following sentence:
~(The provisions of this section do not authorize the court to review any decision or
order from which an appeal might have
been taken." The clear implication of this
provision is that the Court may not review
any decisions or order from which an appeal might have been but was not taken.
Applying this provision to the case at bar
it seems clear that this court is not authorized to review, the jUdgment against defen,dant from which no appeal was taken.
. To :summarize, it appears that the,plaintiff appealed from the portion of the judg.ment denying the relief demanded by him
'in his complaint. The majority opinion
holds that his appeal is meritorious. The
relief demanded by defendant was by way
of cross-complaint and the judgment denied

her such rdief. She did not appeal. It is
conceded that her claim of title is based
upon instruments entirely separate and
apart from the instruments on which plaintiff's claim of title is based. Defendant
has not sought to have this court review
the portion of the judgment denying her
relief on her cross-complaint. It is obvious
that the portion of the judgment denying
her relief on her cross-complaint is in no
wise related to the portion of the judgment denying plaintiff the relief deman,ded
in his complaint. There is no interdependence between the two portions of the judgment. Such being the case, it is clear under both the code provisions relating to review on appeal an'd the authorities which
I have cited above' that the' review her'e
should be limited to the portion of the judg. ment from which plaintiff appealed, and
that the judgment agai~si defendant from
which no appeal was taken sh€luld riot be
reviewed.
As stated earlier in this opinion the orily
case holding to the contrary' is -Hamasaki v.
Flotho, supra. The decision in that case
was based upon the theory advanced by the
majority that even though there was no appeal from the judgment and only an appeal from an order granting a limited new
trial, this court had the power to review the
judgment because it felt required to do so
uin the interests of justice." There- was no
question of any interdependence in the
Hamasaki case as there was only one judgment and one 'order, both of which were in
favor of the respondent. The majority
now rely upon the Hamasaki case as authority for reversing the judgment agamst
defendant in the case at bar from which no
appeal has been taken. Certainly the Hamasaki case is not authority for the holding
in this case. The other cases relied upon by
the majority clearly fall within the exception to the rule that where the part of the
judgment appealed from is so interwoven
and connected with the remainder, or so
dependent thereon, that the appeal from a
part affects the other parts or involves a
consideration of the whole, that it is really
.an appeal from the whole judgment. The
case at bar' ,does not fall within this rule

OSBORN v. OS'BORN
Cite o.s 267 P .2d 333
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as clearly appears from what I have here- stated that "Justice is what is well estofore stated.
tablished" and that "Justice is compliance
It should be noted that the foregoing rule wi,th the written laws." I find no basis
relates only to judgments which are not for the holding of the majority in this case
divisible into separate parts. lAnd in order in any concept of justice with-which I am
for the rule to be -applicable, the judgment, familiar.

on its face, must disc1os'e that the part appealed from is interwoven with Of dependent upon other parts not appealed from.
In other words, unless the interdependenc'e
of the separate parts of the judgment appears upon the face of the judgment itsel£
there can be no basis for holding that the
part appealed from is so interwoven and
connected with the remainder, or so dependent thereon, that the appeal from a
part affects the other parts or involves a
oonsideration of the whole judgment.
Since the judgment in the case, at bar is in
twq s.eparate and distinct parts or paragraphs_ and neither makes any reference to
the ,other, there is no basis whatever for a
holding that they are in any way interwoven
with or de'p'endent upon each other.
The effect of the majority holding in this
case is not only to 'create confusion in the
law, as it undoubtedly will, hut it places an
additionallburden on both appellate and trial
courts to review portions of judgments
from which no appeal is taken. in clear violation of the statutory provisions which I
have heretofore cited. The right of appeal is clearly statutory as well as the scope
of review. The Legislature has sought to
limit the power of appellate co'urts 'to review only such portions of judgments as
may be appealed from. This legislation
has a dual purpose. First, to reduce the
amount of work required by an appellate
'court in disposing of an appeal, and second,
to limit the issues which' may be retried in
the trial court in the event of a reversal
which should have the effect of saving the
time of both the trial court and litigants.
It now appears that the majority of this
court not only ignores this salutary legislation but overrules the long line of authorities upholding and applying such legislation without even mentioning either the
legislation or, the authorities. The majority
claims the right to do this "in the 'interests
of justice." However, it, has been aptly

SCHAUER, 'Justice.
I dissent. It is rp,y view that the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McComb of the
District Court of Appeal, Second District,
Division Two (Osborn v. Osborn (1953;
Cal.App.), 256 P.2d 653, 657), correctly disposes of the legal issues presented by the
undisputed fads alleged; proved, and found
in this case. I shall state the facts in somewhat greater detail than they are stated by
Justice McComb in order that I may hereinafter point out those :facts which, in my
opinion, have caused the majority of this
court to announce an erroneous view of
the applicable law.
In order to compromise a dispute as to
who was entitled to the property of Chloie
I. Osborn, deceased mother of plaintiff
Merinoeth and wife of Thomas D. Osborn,
plaintiff and Thomas on June 27, 1939,
executed a contract entitled "Stipulation."
The ,validity of this contract is not questioned. On July 21, 1939, such contract
was filed in the proceeding for probate of
the estate of Chloie 1. Osborn. It provides
in material part that the probate court
may set aside disputed real property (Lot
97) to Thomas as having been the homestead of Thomas and -Chloie; that Thomas
"will execute either by deed, contract or
declaration of trust, sufficient documents,
conveyances or declarations so that * *
Lot 97 * * • will be retained in the
name of' Thomas D. Oshorn, during his
lifetime and that the same should vest in
his Son Merinoeth R. Osborn at the time of
the demise of the said Thomas '* *. *
[A]ll income on the properly will go to
and belong to Thomas D. Osborn during
his lifetime and out of the said sum of
monies received, he will .pay all ordinary
and usual expenses, such as, maintenance,
taxes, repair and ordinary improvements
due to wear and tear. Any surplus from
said amounts ·shall belong to Thomas * *.
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This Stipulation shall be binding upon the
h-eirs, executors, administrators and assigns
of the parties hereto."
Pursuant to this agreement the probate
court on July 21, 1939, determined that Lot
97 had been the homestead of Thomas and
Chloie and set it aside to Thomas as his
separate property.
On July 7, 1939, Thomas signed a grant
deed of Lot 97 to plaintiff Merinoeth, "re~
serving to the grantor the exclusive posses,sian and the use and enjoyment in his own
right of the rents, issues and profits 'of
said property * * * during the term of
his natural life. This deed is executed in
accordance with the terms and conditions of
that certain trust agreement of July 7th,
1939, * * * and is subject to all conditions, exceptions and reservations as in
said trust agreement provided."
The "trust agreement" of July 7- provides
'(hat "the said deed is to be turned over
,and delivered to the trustees herein [Finkenstein and Warner] to be used, delivered
and held under, the terms and. conditions in
this agreement set forth"; th~ deed shall
reserve to Thomas, the grantor, a life
estate and tIthe right to revoke the deed in
the event second ·party [Merinoeth] wilfully harms grantor, and second party
reserves the right to cancel this agreement
if grantor wilfully harms second party";
the only powers and duties of the trustees
are to keep the deed and not record it
during the life of Thomas and to deliver it
to Merinoeth only on the death of Thomas,
and to defend against any attempt by either
party Uto break the terms of the within trust
agreement"; Thomas tlagrees to, will any
and all right, title,' or interest he may have
in said real property toll Merinoeth j the
agreement is binding on the heirs, executors, and assigns of the parties; and "the
wilful failure or refusal of either party to
comply with the obligations herein provided, on his part to be performed, shall
permit either party to rescind this agreement and shall confer upon the gr.antor the
right to cancel the within mentioned deed
and this agreement."
On January 14, 1946, Merinoeth,' Thomas,
and the trustees executed an j!agreement

cancelling _trust agreement." In March,.
1946, by :iui' exchange of'Ie'tters, the parties
agreed to rescind the cancellation agree'ment. 'These-two agreements were executed
in the ,course of unsuccessful negotiations,
'between: Thomas and plaintiff for the purchase by Thomas of plaintiff's interest in
Lot 97. Evidence of the negotiations and'
the canceIIation agreements and accompanying letters has probative 'value as it
tends to show that Thomas recognized that.
.Merinoeth had a valuable remainder interest.
The opinion of Justice McComb disposes.
of the issues raised' by the above stated'
~acts in the following manner:
uQuestions: First: Did the trial court
properly decline to quiet title in, the PMcd
of land iit question in plai'Mifj?
u Yes. The following rules are here·
pertinent:
"(1) An escrow is a written instrument
or personal property which is delivered to a_
third party by the grantor, maker, promisoror obligor to be held by the depositary
until the happening of a designated event
or the' performance of a designated .condition and then to be delivered to the
grantee, 'promisee or obligee. (Civ.Code, §'
1057. See also cited cases in 10 Cal.Jur..
[1923] Escrows, § I, n. 2, p. 576.)
"(2) When a dced is deposited by "
grantor with a third person to be handed'
to the grantee on the death of the grantor* * * without any intention of a present transfer of title, but on the contrary,.
with the intention of the grantor to reserve
the right of dominion over the deed and th~
right to revoke or recall it there is no·
effective delivery. * * * (Williams v.
Kidd [1915], 170 Cal. 631; 637 et seq. [lSI
P. I, Ann.Cas.1916E, 703].)
H(3) Plaintiff in a quiet title action mu'st
depend on the strength of his own title and
not on the weakness of that of defendant.
Thus, if he fails to prove title in himself,
he is not entitled to recover. (Alspach v.
Landrum [1947], 82 Cal.App.2d 901, 903[I] [187 P.2d 130]; Tanner v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co. [1942], 20 Cal.2d 814, 825 [13}
[129 P.2d 383].)

DAN1ELS~BRIDGES
Cite as 261 P .2d 343
tc Applying the
i~regoing rules to the
·facts in the present case we 'find that under
'rule (1) the handing of the deed to defendants Finkenstein and Warner created an
escrow, and since Mr. Osborn reserved the
right to revoke or cancel the deed upon the
happening of certain conditions, there was
no intent to make an unconditional delivery
:Of the deed. Therefore, it not having been
delivered to plaintiff prior to his father's
<leath, under rule (2) the deed was never
-delivered and no title passed to plaintiff.
Hence, under rule (3), plaintiff having
failed to -prove title in himself the trial court
properly held that he was not entitled to
have title quieted in him.
"Second: Was there substantial evidence to sustain the trial court's finding
that the transaction between the parties did
1'ot create a trust agreement but merely
created an escrow?
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perform the June 27 agreement. It appears
that the June 27 agreement, rather' than the
trust agreement, was binding and enforceable. And the June 27 agreement has never
been discharged by' performance or otherwise.
The majority opinion here appears to be
an attempt to give, or to lay the foundation
for giving, plaintiff .Merinoeth and the
nonappealing cross-complainant Louise, a
remedy akin to quasi-specific enforcement
of the June 27 agreement. But that is a
remedy which Merinoeth should have
sought against the representatives of the
estate of his deceased father, and Merinoeth
has not seen fit to institute such proceedings
and proceed on such a theory,
For the reasons above stated I should
affirm the judgment.
Rehearing
SCHAUER,

denied i
CARTER
dissenting.

and

JJ.,

"Yes. The transaction falls squarely
within the definition of an escrow as set
forth under rule (1) supra. There is a
total absence of any of the elements of a
trust agreement. Therefore the court's
finding is supported by substantial evi...
dence."
The majority herein proceed upon' the
fallacious premise that "Thomas was bound
by the terms of the trust agreement, ex~
ecuted contemporaneously with the deed,
not to attempt to recall the deed from the
possession of the trustees * * *, Thomas did not retain control over the deed after
he delivered it to the trustees. There is
nothing in the trust agreement, or external
to it, to indicate that Thomas did not intend
the transmission of the deed to the trustees
to be a valid legal delivery," Obviously
such "finding" by the majority invades the
province of the trier of fact and draws
inferences from both the documents and
the surrounding circumstances contrary to
those drawn by the tri.al judge. Why was
an escrow created and conditions for cancellation specified if the. deli~ery was un.conditional? Furthermore, I cannot agree
that ,jThomas was ,bound by the terms of
the trust agreement." The signing by
"Thomas of the' July 7 trust agreement and
deed :was, at best, an ineffective attem~t to
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DANIELS v. BRIDGES.
elv. 19825.

District Court of Appeal, ..second District,
Division 3, California.
March 1, 1954.

Suit for declaratory relief, to establish a constructive trust and for an injunction involving right to revoke a joint will.
From a judgment of the Superior Court,
Los Angeles County. James M. Allen, J.,
in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal, Vallee, J.,
held that survivor of husband and wife
who made a joint will devising property to
third person after death of both was entitled to revoke will; in absence of any contract depriving survivor of right of revocation .
Judgment affirmed.
I. Wills $=>100

A Ujoint will" is a single testamentary
instrument constituting or containing the

